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Amplifying Re´nyi Differential Privacy via Shuffling
ELOISE BERTHIER, MLO, EPFL
SAI PRANEETH KARIMIREDDY, MLO, EPFL
Differential privacy is a useful tool to build machine learning models which do not release too much infor-
mation about the training data. We study the Re´nyi differential privacy of stochastic gradient descent when
each training example is sampled without replacement (also known as cyclic SGD). Cyclic SGD is typically
faster than traditional SGD and is the algorithm of choice in large-scale implementations. We recover pri-
vacy guarantees for cyclic SGD which are competitive with those known for sampling with replacement. Our
proof techniques make no assumptions on the model or on the data and are hence widely applicable.
NOTE: e current proof is incorrect. In eorem 3.1, we assumed that the probability
distributionwi remains the same for the neighboring datasets D and D
′. As was pointed
out to us, this is incorrect and we are currently working on fixing this.
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning with differential privacy [6] (DP) and its relaxations have sparked growing in-
terest in the last few years. Several approaches have been proposed to optimize models with
stochastic gradient descent (SGD) using private data, including objective perturbation [4], output
perturbation [5] and gradient perturbation [1]. e laer is the most widely applicable, since it
makes lile assumptions on the model or on the data.
In this paper, we are interested in analyzing the effect of the order in which data is processed
on privacy. Consider one epoch of SGD with batch size one. At each step, one can independently
pick uniformly at random a new training sample. We call this method sampling with replacement.
Another option is to first make a permutation of the whole dataset, and then process all the samples
according to this permuted ordering. is secondmethod, known as sampling without replacement
or as cyclic SGD, is known to have faster convergence [3, 9] and is hence more widely used in
practice. While the privacy of the ”sampling with replacement” method is well-known [1], it is
unclear how usual proof techniques extend to the second approach. Recently, the effect of shuffling
on ε pure differential privacy has been studied [7]. However, relaxations such as (ε, δ ) differential
privacy or Re´nyi differential privacy are more popular since they are able to obtain smaller privacy
budgets.
We perform an analysis of the Re´nyi differential privacy (RDP) [11] of SGDwithout replacement,
with a particular focus on privacy guarantees that still hold in a non-convex seing. We prove
privacy guarantees for sampling without replacement which are asymptotically similar to those
for sampling with replacement, with the restriction that each epoch is stopped part-way through
the dataset has been processed. We also provide a toy example showing that the two sampling
methods can have different behaviours in terms of privacy.
Re´nyi differential privacy. Pure differential privacy is a strong but hard to enforce guarantee.
It was first relaxed with the weaker (ε, δ ) differential privacy, and then with the intermediate
notion of Re´nyi differential privacy (RDP) [11]. RDP has the triple advantage of (i) being easy to
work with Gaussian perturbations, (ii) simple composition properties, and (iii) easy amplification
via subsampling [2, 12], under some assumptions on the required privacy level.
Given a dataset D = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ R
r×n and some algorithm A, suppose D ′ is a dataset that
differs from D only in one data point. en, define p and q be the probability distributions of the
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output ofA onD andD ′ respectively. e algorithmA is said to have (α , ε(α)) Re´nyi differential
privacy if:
Dα (p | |q) :=
1
α − 1
log
∫
Rn×d
p(u)αq(u)1−αdu ≤ ε(α) .
2 MAIN RESULTS
2.1 Algorithm
Given a dataset D = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ R
r×n , we run e epochs of cyclic SGD with batch size one.
Our algorithm takes as inputs the dataset, an initial parameter θ0 ∈ R
d , a learning rate γ > 0,
a loss function ℓ : Rd × Rr → R and a gradient clipping parameter L > 0. Every epoch, we
make a permutation Si of D, then return a sequence of parameters (θ1, ..., θt ) computed aer t
clipped gradient steps with loss ℓ, processing the dataset in order. At each gradient step, Gaussian
noise is added to the stochastic gradient, so that each gradient step (ignoring gradient clipping for
readability) is:
θt+1 = θt − γ
(
∇θ ℓ(θt , xs(t )) + ηt
)
with ηt ∼ N(0,σ
2Id ) .
Importantly, our algorithm only processes τ ∈ (0, 1) fraction of the shuffled data before moving
on to the next epoch—it does not perform a full cycle. is is crucial to our privacy results.
Algorithm 1 Private SGD with Shuffling
1: procedure Private SGD with Shuffling(D = (xi )i=1, ...,n, θ0,γ , ℓ, L, e, τ ,σ
2)
2: θ ← θ0
3: for i = 1 to e/τ do ⊲ e is the expected number of passes over each data point
4: (s1, . . . , sn) ← RandomPermutation({1, . . . ,n}) ⊲ Shuffle the data
5: for j = 1 to ⌊τn⌋ do ⊲ Each pass over the dataset is stopped part-way
6: x ← xsj
7: д ← Clip(∇θ ℓ(θ , x), L)
8: Sample η ∼ N(0,σ 2Id )
9: θ ← θ − γ (д + η)
10: return θ ⊲ Return the final model or alternatively the whole sequence of {θt }
2.2 Privacy Guarantees
Theorem 2.1 (Privacy of one step). At any epoch e and step t of Algorithm 1, let θ[1:t ] =
{θ1, . . . , θt } be the outputs. Conditioned on θ[1:t ] and assuming σ
2 ≥ 4L2, the t + 1-th step satis-
fies (α , εt (α))-RDP for
εt (α) ≤
16αL2
(n − t + 1)2σ 2
+ O
(
1
(n − t + 1)3
)
.
e privacy bound degrades with t , and ultimately at t = n no privacy is obtained. is is the
main reason why we only process τ fraction of each epoch. e condition on σ 2 corresponds to
the high noise/high privacy regime considered in [1]. We can then use eorem 2.1 to obtain the
following global privacy guarantee on our procedure.
Theorem 2.2 (Global privacy). e output sequence of parameters {θt } given by Algorithm 1
satisfies (α , ε(α))-Re´nyi differential privacy for
σ 2 = max
(
16eαL2
n(1 − τ )ε(α)
, 4L2
)
+ O
(
1
n2
)
.
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Proof. We will mainly rely on (Proposition 1) from [11] which states that a composition of a
(α , ε1) and (α , ε2) RDP procedures is (α , ε1 + ε2)-RDP. We thus have that assuming σ
2 ≥ 4L2, the
privacy of Algorithm 1 is
ε(α) ≤
⌊
e
τ
⌋∑
i=1
⌊nτ ⌋∑
j=1
{
16αL2
(n − j + 1)2σ 2
+ O
(
1
(n − t + 1)3
)}
≤
16eαL2
τσ 2
{∫ n
(1−τ )n
dx
x2
+ O
(
1
n2
)}
≤
16eαL2
n(1 − τ )σ 2
+ O
(
1
n2
)
. 
Our analysis recovers the same asymptotic rate as for sampling with replacement [1]. We
can easily translate the bounds into (ε, δ ) differential privacy: Algorithm 1 has privacy (ε(α) +
log(1/δ )/(α − 1), δ ) for any 0 < δ < 1 [11]. Tighter (ε, δ ) bounds can be obtained using a privacy
accountant as in [1] that keeps track of the privacy loss at each step and uses the optimal α .
3 PROOF OVERVIEW
3.1 Privacy amplification via non-uniform subsampling
Subsampling the dataset with ratio ρ = 1/n before using an (α , ε)-RDP algorithm roughly increases
its privacy to (α , ρ2ε) [12] and this is used to compute the RDP of SGD with replacement. Suppose
instead that we are subsampling with non uniform weights (w1, ...,wn) [10]. ese weights may
potentially depend on the processed data but can be upper bounded almost surely wi ≤ c . en
we have the following generalization:
Theorem 3.1 (non-uniform subsampling). Suppose that A is (α , ε(α))-RDP for any integer α
when run on data C. en suppose that A is run on a subsampled dataset C♯ where for any data
point xi ∈ C, Pr[xi ∈ C
♯] ≤ c . e new procedure is (α , ε ♯(α))-RDP:
ε ♯(α) ≤
1
α − 1
log
(
1 + 4c2
(
α
2
)
(eε (2) − 1) + 2
α∑
j=3
c j
(
α
j
)
e(j−1)ε (j)
)
.
Proof. is is a generalization of eorem 9 from [12] and closely follows the same proof. e
only difference being in Proposition 21 which states the effect of subsampling on the ternary DP,
where we need to replace 1/n by c with an inequality. 
3.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
We will assume for simplicity that Algorithm 1 runs only for one epoch with output (θ1, ..., θk ) ∈
R
k×d for k = ⌊τn⌋. Let θ[1:t ] := (θ1, ..., θt ) denote all the past iterates (in this epoch) until t . Con-
ditioned on the previous iterates θ[1:t−1], θt is a mixture of n Gaussians where each distribution
corresponds to using a particular datapoint x . In the case of uniform sampling with replacement,
this mixture has uniform weights 1/n, which allows the direct use of subsampling theorems. How-
ever in the case of sampling without replacement, the sampling weights could possibly depend on
the previous iterates θ[1:t−1] since within an epoch each datapoint is sampled at most once.
Recall that (s1, . . . , sn) are the random variables indicating the shuffled indices. e following
holds, for any t ∈ {1, ...,n} and θ[1:t−1]:
p(θt |θ[1:t−1]) =
n∑
k=1
p(θt |θ[1:t−1], st = k)p(st = k |θ[1:t−1])
3
θℓ(θ )
ℓ1(θ ) = sin(πθ )/π
ℓ2(θ ) = − sin(πθ )/π
−1−2 0 1 2
Fig. 1. The two possible loss functions, depending on the training example
where we used the fact that θt ⊥ θ[1:t−2] |θt−1, st . Here p(θt |θt−1, st = k) is a Gaussian distribution
with mean θt−1 − γ∇θ ℓ(θt−1, xk ) and variance γ
2σ 2Id . Further, note that almost surely p(st =
k |θ[1:t−1]) ≤
1
n−t+1
.
us we can use eorem 3.1 to bound the privacy of θt . Note that the update step (without
considering the subsampling) is (α , ε(α) = 2αL2/σ 2)-RDP [11] (where L is the gradient clipping
parameter, such that the sensitivity of one gradient step is less than 2L). eorem 3.1 then tells us
that:
εt (α) ≤
1
α − 1
log
(
1 +
4
(n − t + 1)2
(
α
2
)
(eε (2) − 1) + 2
α∑
j=3
1
(n − t + 1)j
(
α
j
)
e(j−1)ε (j)
)
Because of the use of Gaussian noise, as noted by [12], this bound has a different behaviour de-
pending on the size of σ 2. We consider the case of σ 2 large enough (σ 2 ≥ 4L2), which is the one
handled in [1]. en we can simplify the above terms to obtain eorem 2.1. 
4 SAMPLINGWITH REPLACEMENT CAN BE MORE PRIVATE
One might wonder why our privacy guarantee is weaker for sampling without replacement than
for sampling with replacement, while both would be expected to have similar behaviours. Here
we present a toy example where DP depends on the type of sampling. θ is initialized at 0 and
each training example corresponds either to the non-convex loss function ℓ1 or to ℓ2 (see Fig. 1).
e algorithm does two SGD steps with step-size 1, then with probability p returns the final θ ,
otherwise chooses a response uniformly among {−2, 0, 2} (output perturbation). With p = 1/2,
sampling with replacement has log(1.75)-DP, while sampling without replacement only has log(4)-
DP.
Intuitively, the example is built such that choosing twice the same data point preserves more
privacy (one cannot tell between (ℓ1, ℓ1) and (ℓ2, ℓ2)) than choosing different ones ((ℓ1, ℓ2) and
(ℓ2, ℓ1) end up in different states). is is a very simple example of randomized response where
pure DP can be computed exactly, but the same principle can be applied to SGD with gradient
perturbation, albeit with approximate computations.
5 CONCLUSION
We proposed a simple analysis of the privacy of SGD with gradient perturbation when sampling
is done without replacement. We make no assumptions on the convexity or smoothness of the
problem. Our analysis extends results from [8] to non convex seings, when it is possible to shuffle
the training data. e privacy guarantees are almost the same as for sampling with replacement
[1], up to a slight modification of the shuffling procedure. is might be advantageous in practice
since cyclic SGD is more commonly used and empirically converges significantly faster. A caveat
though is that it is unclear if cyclic SGD with the noise added still retains its speed of convergence.
Further, our guarantees hold even when the whole sequence of iterates is released, allowing its
4
use in distributed and decentralized seings where multiple workers want to hide the data from
each other.
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